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ABSTRACT
BEHAVIORAL CUES ASSOCIATED WITH LIES OF OMISSION AND OF
COMMISSION: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
by Brianna Ratliff
December 2011
Deception is a universal communication behavior across and within species. In
humans, the purpose of verbal deception, or lying, is to intentionally mislead, and this
behavior can be intuitively broken down into two unique categories based on the method
used to mask the truth: omission and commission. Lies of omission involve the
intentional exclusion of important information, whereas lies of commission involve the
intentional generation of false information. Because these two types of deception involve
contrasting methods of delivery, it is possible that lies of omission and lies of
commission could result in differing behavioral presentations. Accordingly, the purpose
of this study was to explore the behavioral patterns exhibited during lies of omission and
lies of commission. Behavioral cues were observed in 126 men and women during
truthful and deceptive communications. Response time, response latency, speech errors,
adaptor use and pausing were found to distinguish the truthful and deceptive conditions;
however, no significant differences were found between the omission and commission
conditions. Implications are discussed.

ii

COPYRIGHT BY
BRIANNA RATLIFF
2011

The University of Southern Mississippi
BEHAVIORAL CUES ASSOCIATED WITH
LIES OF OMISSION AND OF COMMISSION:
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
by
Brianna Ratliff
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Approved:
_Mitchell E. Berman___________________
Director
_Randolph C. Arnau___________________

_Christopher T. Barry__________________

_Virgil Zeigler-Hill____________________

_Susan A. Siltanen____________________
Dean of the Graduate School

December 2011

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer would like to thank the dissertation committee chair, Dr. Mitchell
Berman, and the other committee members, Dr. Randolph Arnau, Dr. Christopher Barry
and Dr. Virgil Zeigler-Hill, for their advice and support throughout the duration of this
project. I would especially like to thank Dr. Mitchell Berman for his enormous patience
which saw me through to the end of this endeavor.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ...............................................................................................................v
CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1
Deception
Research on the Behavioral Correlates of Deception
The Current Study

II.

METHOD ...................................................................................................23
Participants
Measures
Procedure

III.

RESULTS ..................................................................................................30
Descriptive Statistics
Deception Condition and DASS Scores
Behavioral Correlates

IV.

DISCUSSION .............................................................................................38

APPENDIXES ...................................................................................................................45
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................51

iv

LIST OF TABLES
Table
1.

Descriptive Statistics ..............................................................................................30

2.

DASS Scores between Lie Conditions ..................................................................32

3.

Analyses of Variance of Behavioral Correlates at Baseline ..................................33

4.

Analyses of Variance of Behavioral Correlates as a function of
Baseline/Deception and Omission/Commission ....................................................35

5.

Means and Standard Deviations of Behavioral Correlates of Omission and
Commission Lies ...................................................................................................36

v

1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The notion that deceptive behavior is present across and within numerous species
is well documented in both biology and social psychology. In humans, deception has
been defined as a deliberate attempt to cause another to believe something that is untrue
(Krauss, 1981), and according to DePaulo and Kashy (1998), deception is part of the
fabric of social life, with most humans engaging in deception once or twice a day. Stern
and Stern (1909) defined verbal deception, or lying, as making intentional and
consciously false statements.
Although most acts of deception are minor in nature, deception is frequently
associated with significant norm violations, such as theft, murder and attempts to avoid
punishment for such crimes. For this reason, researchers have long been interested in
identifying behaviors that may discriminate truthful from non-truthful communications.
Although a rich literature exists on the behavioral correlates of lying, no single behavior
or constellation of behaviors can be used to unequivocally identify deceptive
communications and empirical support for the role of several individual behaviors during
deception is frequently contradictory (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Kraut, 1980,
Vrij, 2000).
One potential reason for the contradictions within the deception cue literature
involves the failure of researchers to adequately distinguish between unique subtypes of
deception. Specifically, lying behavior can be informally classified by the specific
approach or method used to deceive another. One method, referred to as omission,
involves leaving out pertinent information whereas the other method, referred to as
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commission, involves generating false information (Hample, 1982). The vast majority of
studies on the behavioral correlates of lying have used paradigms requiring participants to
generate lies of commission (see for example, Vrij, Edwards, Roberts, & Bull, 2000).
However, using a novel laboratory paradigm, Ratliff, Berman, and Barry (2006,
unpublished manuscript) found that, when presented with a social interaction in which
deception was required, participants were much more likely to commit lies of omission
than lies of commission. Because of the small number of deceptive participants
committing lies of commission, however, a meaningful examination of the behaviors
exhibited during each type of lie was not possible in that study. However, it is possible
that because lies of omission and commission employ different methods of deception, the
behaviors or patterns of behavior that accompany each may differ, compared to each
other and to truthful communications.
In this paper, the universality of deception across species is discussed in addition
to the various definitions that have been proposed for deception. The social perceptions,
functions and consequences of lying are then considered to establish the motivation for
human deception. Next, the qualitative differences between truths and lies are discussed,
followed by theoretical and empirical support for behavioral correlates that may
distinguish truths from lies. Because research on deception cues has yielded consistently
conflicting results, a case is built that deception research has largely overlooked a
potentially important variable: the methods used to deliver deception, particularly
omission and commission. Finally, a study conducted to examine the behavioral
correlates of deception during lies of omission and lies of commission is reported.

3
Deception
Deception is an evolutionarily adaptive behavior observed across many different
species. According to Schuiling (2004), “… by faking relevant stimuli and/or interfering
with the way animals process relevant stimuli, species defend themselves against other
species” (p. 171). Some species present misleading information through their bodily
markings. For example, some butterflies have wing-markings that resemble the eyes of
predators, discouraging would-be predators from approaching the butterfly as a meal
(Schuiling, 2004). Animals may also employ deception by omitting behaviors or
information that could potentially lead to an attack. For example, the ability to
camouflage themselves within their environment prevents many lizards, fish, and frogs
from appearing like prey to would be predators (Schuiling, 2004). Through these and
other types of deception, species effectively ensure their survival.
Deception is an integral part of human behavior. As Knapp, Hart and Dennis
(1974) noted, deception plays a central part in the growth, preservation and termination
of human relationships. In the past forty years, deception has received a great deal of
attention within social psychology (for reviews of the literature see DePaulo et al., 1985,
DePaulo et al., 2003), and a number of definitions have been proposed. According to
Krauss (1981) deception occurs when a person purposefully tries to engender a belief in
another that the deceiver believes is untrue. Similarly, DePaulo et al. (2003) defined
deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead others. Some researchers have drawn a
distinction between deception and lying (e.g. Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 2003), in that
deception is identified with evasion, omission, and distortion, whereas lying comprises
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verbal statements generated by one who knows the statements to be false but intends the
receiver to accept as true.
Regardless of the definition, the main precept of deception is its intentional
nature. However, these definitions also allude to two fundamentally different types of
deception: that in which true information is left out and that in which false information is
produced. The importance of this distinction will be revisited later in this proposal. For
the remainder of this paper, the terms deception and lying will be used interchangeably,
as is common within the deception literature.
Social Perceptions and Functions of Deception
To most people, the term deception most commonly elicits an impression of
maliciousness and immorality (Knapp et al., 1974). DePaulo et al. (2004) described the
cultural stereotype of liars as cold and exploitative; that lies undermine people’s integrity,
are condemned by institutionalized religions, and are punishable by law. Given the
stigma attached to lying, it is somewhat ironic that lying is an extremely common
behavior among human beings. According to DePaulo and Kashy (1998), people lie an
average of twice a day. However, does the average person actually engage in such a
socially undesirable behavior so frequently?
According to DePaulo et al. (2004) the answer to this seeming contradiction rests
in the distinction between two very different yet strategically similar types of deception:
big lies and little lies. Big lies are lies associated with the cultural stereotype of moral
deviousness. They are most often employed to conceal truths that are distressing,
shameful, immoral, or illegal, and that could potentially end or ruin relationships,
reputations, or security (DePaulo et al., 2004). DePaulo et al. (2004) posits that there are
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three main motives for telling big lies. The first motive involves attaining material
rewards or other personal pleasures or advantages and is referred to as instrumental lying.
In a study of 66 college students and 107 community members, DePaulo et al. (2004)
found that over 30% of serious lies told over participants’ lifetimes were instrumental
lies. According to DePaulo et al. (2004), the instrumental lie is the big lie that is most
consistent with the cultural stereotype of deception as cold, calculating, and vile.
The second most common motive for lying big is concerned with avoiding
punishment and blame (DePaulo et al., 2004). In the DePaulo et al. (2004) study, this
type of lie accounted for 20% of the big lies told over participants’ lifetimes. These lies
tend to be poorly planned and generally cause considerable discomfort to the sender
while the lie is being told (DePaulo et al., 2004). Entitlement serves as the third most
common motivation for big lies. Lies of entitlement are committed when senders feel
they should be allowed to engage in a behavior that has been prohibited or discouraged
by the target of their lies (DePaulo et al., 2004). Lies of entitlement are almost always
told to authority figures and are more carefully planned than any other type of lie
(DePaulo et al., 2004).
Unlike the big lies just described, not all lies carry the morally devious
connotations most often associated with the concept of deception. DePaulo et al. (2003)
reported that people lie most frequently about their feelings, their preferences, and their
attitudes and opinions. These everyday lies are little lies or the white lies (DePaulo et al.,
2004). Little lies are generally considered benevolent (Wilson, 2003). For example,
consider the cancer patient whose physician withholds the news that his disease is
terminal until after the patient returns from a vacation, or the person who tells their friend
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that a stain on their shirt is not all that noticeable when, in reality, it is difficult to miss.
Little lies can be differentiated from big lies by the intentions of the sender. White lies
are generally intended to smooth over social situations or protect the feelings of others
(DePaulo & Kashy, 1998); malice serves no purpose. Interestingly, although people
generally regard these lies as relatively inconsequential (DePaulo et al., 2004), they still
experience a noticeable amount of discomfort while telling them (DePaulo & Kashy,
1998), suggesting that even white lies are somewhat objectionable.
Consequences of Lies
As noted, people lie for a variety of reasons. Although the vast majority of lies are
relatively inconsequential (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), big lies are synonymous with the
threat of severe consequences if they are discovered. The potential loss of trust or
credibility (DePaulo et al., 1985), the destruction of relationships, and loss of privileges,
such as employment (DePaulo et al., 2004), freedom and in extreme cases, life, are
salient reasons for a liar to strive for believability. Accordingly, Frank and Ekman (1997)
proposed that, the more severe the consequence, the more highly motivated one might be
to lie.
Qualitative Differences between Lies and Truths
The motivated liar faces a number of obstacles when attempting to make a
fabrication seem believable. These obstacles result from the qualitative differences that
exist between lies and truths, and include such variables as cognitive complexity,
emotional experiences and arousal, as well as stereotypical beliefs about deceptive and
truthful behavior.
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First, telling a lie is cognitively more complex than telling the truth (Porter &
Yuille, 1996; Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij & Heaven, 1999). Lying requires the generation of
false information or the omission of compromising true information, whereas the truth
simply involves recalling stored information from memory. Additionally, the information
generated in a lie must appear as similar to the truth as possible, and include elements
that contribute to believability. Creating these elements takes time and mental effort (Vrij
& Heaven, 1999).
Besides being more cognitively difficult to produce, deception also commonly
involves unique emotional experiences. Guilt, fear and excitement are the most common
emotions experienced during deception (Ekman, 1985; 1988). Because they typically do
not accompany truthful communications, these emotions must be concealed in order for
deception to be successful. According to Ekman (1985; 1988) guilt is most commonly
experienced when liars respect the person to whom they are lying, when the person being
deceived is not consenting to the lie and does not benefit from the lie, and finally, when
the lie is in no way authorized by any social group or institution. Deception is also an
anxiety producing experience (deTurck & Miller, 1985). Ekman (1985; 1988) proposed
that anxiety is typically associated with the fear of getting caught in a lie; it is strongest
when the consequences for being caught are very high, when the lie is not rehearsed or
fully planned out, when the liar has not successfully told a particular lie in the past, or
when the liar believes that the person to whom they are lying is suspicious, or is likely to
become suspicious. According to Ekman (1985; 1988), the final emotion that is
commonly experienced during deception is excitement, which he referred to as “duping
delight.” Duping delight occurs when liars experience pleasure and excitement over
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fooling their audience (Ekman, 1985; 1988). Because excitement, guilt, and fear are not
typically experienced during honest communications, they serve as a threat to a liar’s
credibility, and are therefore important features that must be concealed in order for a liar
to appear truthful.
Another way in which deception differs from the truth is in the arousal
experienced. For example, in a study of 60 undergraduates, deTurck and Miller (1985)
found that the arousal experienced during deception is unique. Liars exhibited
significantly more arousal as measured by sympathetic activation than truthful subjects
exposed to a stressful stimulus. Deceiver’s arousal resulted in significantly more
fidgeting, gesturing, speech errors, and pausing, longer response latencies and shorter
response lengths, suggesting that behavior produced by this type of arousal can
distinguish deceivers from non-deceivers, even in contexts that may be anxiety-producing
to non-deceivers (deTurck & Miller, 1985).
A final complication to successful deception concerns the differing assumptions
that people make about truthful and deceptive behavior. Stereotypes exist regarding how
people behave when they are telling the truth and when they are lying; these stereotypes
are common among laypersons and law enforcement alike. According to Akehurst,
Kohnken, Vrij and Bull (1996) and Stromwall and Granhag (2003), people believe that
liars are more fidgety, and that they avoid eye contact and smile more than those who are
telling the truth, and that their statements are less plausible and less consistent over time.
In short, people have a preconceived notion of how liars behave and these stereotypes
may potentially influence a liar’s attempt to appear truthful.
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Each of the obstacles facing the motivated liar has been associated with distinct
behavioral correlates. For example, increases in cognitive complexity have been
associated with decreased use of gestural movements accompanying speech (e.g. Ekman,
1997; Ekman & Friesen, 1972), and increases in speech hesitations and speech errors
(e.g. Vrij & Heaven, 1999). Increased response latencies (e.g., Goldman-Eisler, 1968)
and greater pupil dilation (e.g., Kahneman, 1973) have also been associated with more
cognitively complex tasks.
Regarding emotional experiences, Ekman et al. (1969) and Izard (1971) found
consistent evidence that emotions, such as enjoyment, anger, fear, sadness, disgust and
surprise, are associated with unique facial expressions that have been observed across
cultures (Ekman, 1992). Very slight, yet distinct, expression changes have been
documented when people are trying to conceal their emotions. According to Ekman,
Friesen, and O’Sullivan (1988) these “micro expressions” result when the facial muscles
representative of the emotion the deceiver is attempting to conceal are not entirely
suppressed (p. 414). Simultaneously, the muscles required for the feigned emotion are not
fully engaged, resulting in a facial expression that sends mixed signals. For example,
Ekman et al. (1988) found that people trying to suppress the emotion of disgust or fear
with a pleasant facial expression exhibited smiling lips, but failed to engage the eye
muscles used during genuine smiling, resulting in a smile that appeared insincere.
As with cognitive complexity and emotion, increases in arousal are also
associated with unique changes in behavior. Increases in stress result in increased
activation of the sympathetic nervous system (deTurck & Miller, 1985). Indicators, such
as heart rate and electrodermal reactivity, have been shown to increase as individuals are
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aroused or stressed (for a review of the literature on arousal and sympathetic activation
see Waid & Orne, 1982).
Theories of the Behavioral Correlates of Deception
Because successful deception requires adequately navigating obstacles such as
cognitive complexity, unique emotional experiences, arousal, and social stereotypes, it is
conceivable that the behaviors associated with these variables may also theoretically be
associated with deception. Accordingly, Ekman and Friesen (1969) proposed a rationale
supporting the existence of behavioral correlates of deception, which they suggested
could be divided into two types of cues: leakage cues and deception cues. Leakage cues
result when liars fail to completely mask the real emotion they are experiencing, allowing
some facial indicators of their true feelings to escape; whereas deception cues betray the
likelihood that a lie is being told by contributing information that does not fit with the
liar’s previous presentation. Leakage cues give hints about the emotions a liar may be
experiencing; deception cues give reason to question a liar’s believability.
This theory suggests that emotion plays a significant role in deception behavior
Ekman (1985; 1982). Ekman (1985; 1988) argued that by understanding the previously
discussed emotions that liars are experiencing, one should be able to predict the behaviors
liars would exhibit. For example, as fear of getting caught increases, fear cues, such as
higher pitch, faster and louder speech, pauses, speech errors and fearful micro
expressions, should also increase (DePaulo et al., 2003).
Zuckerman et al. (1981) provided a similar theory supporting the existence of
behavioral correlates of deception, suggesting that deception consists of unique patterns
of thoughts, feelings and processes; therefore, the behavioral correlates of these aspects
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should be indicative of deception. These aspects proposed by Zuckerman et al. (1981) are
very similar to the deception obstacles discussed in the previous section. Because
deception is stressful, liars could be expected to exhibit greater pupil dilation, increased
blinking, more frequent speech disturbances and higher pitch (Zuckerman et al., 1981).
Emotions, such as guilt and fear, may result in more fidgeting, and a more unpleasant
demeanor (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Because lying is more cognitively complex than
telling the truth, Zuckerman et al. (1981) suggested that liars could be expected to exhibit
longer response latencies, greater pupil dilation, and fewer gestures. Finally, in an effort
to behave in a stereotypically truthful manner, Zuckerman et al. (1981) proposed that
liars would attempt to avoid behaviors that are stereotypically associated with lying, such
as looking away and smiling, and therefore may appear stiff, unnatural, or overcontrolled.
In addition to the previous theories, Buller and Burgoon (1996) proposed a
communication theory on deception behavior, arguing that interpersonal communicative
processes are just as important as individual psychological variables in predicting
deception behavior. They noted that deceivers engage in multiple tasks simultaneously,
including presenting the deceptive message, monitoring the target for suspiciousness, and
modifying their behavior correspondingly (DePaulo et al., 2003). According to their
theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), deceivers should have the most difficulty managing
these tasks at the beginning of their deceptive presentation, but, as the interaction
progresses and deceivers receive feedback on their performance, they should display
more pleasantness, composure and fluency. Buller and Burgoon (1996) also suggested
that there is no single profile of deceptive behaviors, as patterns of behavior are
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dependent on multiple factors such as expectations, goals, motivations, relationship to the
target and the target’s level of suspicion (DePaulo et al., 2003).
A final theory on the behavioral cues to deception contributes a selfpresentational approach (DePaulo, 1992) to the deception cue rationale. According to
DePaulo (1992) self-presentation is an attempt to control the impressions that are formed
of oneself, and based on this definition, all lies are self-presentational in nature.
According to DePaulo’s (1992) theory, most deception cues are weak because most lies
are about relatively inconsequential matters (DePaulo et al., 2003). Both truth-tellers and
liars claim to be honest; however, the difference between their claims is that the liar’s
claim is illegitimate (DePaulo et al., 2003). DePaulo et al. (2003) asserts that the
dissonance between what liars claim and what they believe may yield cues to deceit.
DePaulo et al. (2003) described two important implications of this type of
dissonance: that deceptive self-presentations are not as convincingly embraced by the
sender as are truthful self-presentations and that social actors typically feel a greater
sense of deliberateness during deception as compared to truthful communications. First,
DePaulo et al. (2003) theorized that the liar’s decreased conviction may be attributed to a
number of factors, such as the presence of moral dilemmas, differing levels of personal
investment in lies compared to truths, as well as a lack of memory-based evidence and
experience that lends to believability. According to DePaulo et al. (2003), the deceiver’s
lack of conviction leads them to “… appear less forthcoming, less pleasant, and more
tense” (p. 77).
Second, a greater sense of deliberateness also affects the behavior of deceivers
(DePaulo et al., 2003). Acting deliberately, as opposed to acting naturally, is an attempt
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to seem more credible. According to DePaulo et al. (2003) attempts to seem more
credible require self-regulation, which, in turn, requires mental resources. Therefore,
while self-regulating deceivers may redirect mental activity away from other important
tasks, such as monitoring a target’s reactions, which may result in failure to compensate
if the target becomes suspicious. DePaulo et al. (2003) proposes that liars direct most of
their control to their behavior. Liars try to behave in a manner inconsistent with
stereotypical deceptive behavior, for example, looking people square in the eye and
avoiding fidgeting. The result is a composure that may appear overly controlled and held
back (DePaulo et al., 2003). DePaulo et al. (2003) held that motivation to successfully
deceive moderates behavioral indicators of self-regulation. The more motivation a liar
experiences, the harder he or she tries to appear truthful, resulting in an appearance that
seems even more awkward or suspicious.
Research on the Behavioral Correlates of Deception
Each of the previous theories supports the potential existence of behavioral cues
or patterns of cues that distinguish truthful from deceptive behaviors. The usefulness of
the ability to accurately detect deception is undeniable, as deception is frequently
associated with social violations. Accordingly, the literature exploring the potential
behavioral correlates of deception is extensive. Unfortunately, the results of these studies
are mixed, with some findings indicating that specific cues discriminate honest from
deceptive communications (for a review of the literature see DePaulo et al., 1985;
DePaulo et al., 2003), whereas other studies find no support for the discriminatory ability
of the same cue (e.g., Kraut & Poe, 1980; Stiff & Miller, 1986). The behaviors most
commonly investigated as potential cues to deception can be generally categorized by the
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communication channel used, specifically, the face, the body, or the voice (De Paulo et
al., 1985). In the following sections, each category will be discussed.
Facial Cues
Facial actions and expressions, such as shifty eyes (Kraut & Poe, 1980; Vrij &
Semin, 1996) and guilty smiles (Kraut, 1978) are stereotypically associated with
deception. Hocking and Leathers (1980) theorized that deceivers attempt to appear
truthful by suppressing these behaviors. However, empirical investigation has not
definitively supported this proposal. Specifically, neither the presence nor absence of
either of these cues definitively identifies deceptive communications. Researchers have
also investigated the relationship between blinking and deception. Results for blinking
are somewhat more consistent than other facial cues, with increased rate of eye blinks
generally associated with deceptive behavior. A discussion of representative studies from
the deception literature for these three facial cues follows.
Eye contact. A small number of studies have found that eye contact (shifty eyes
phenomenon) either decreases (e.g., Buller, Comstock, Aune, & Strzysewski, 1989;
Knapp et al., 1974) or increases (Bond, Kahler, & Paolicelli, 1985; Granhag &
Stromwall, 2002; Riggio & Friedman, 1983) during deceptive communications.
However, the majority of studies have found no difference in the amount of eye contact
exhibited by liars and truth tellers (Buller & Aune, 1987; Bond, Omar, Mahmoud, &
Bonser, 1990; deTurck & Miller, 1985; Heilveil & Muehleman, 1981; Hess & Kleck,
1994; Kraut & Poe, 1980; McClintock & Hunt, 1975; Vrij, 1995; Vrij, Edward, Roberts
& Bull, 2000).
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Disagreement on the role of eye contact during deception may be related to a
number of factors. First, because deception was often not spontaneous, participants may
not have experienced the realistic emotions thought to accompany unsanctioned
deception. Another possibility is that the discrepancies may result from the extremely
short amount of time in which each participant’s behavior was observed. In a study of
twenty-four students who viewed a video of a mock crime, Granhag and Stromwall
(2002) found that the differences in eye contact between truthful and deceptive
participants became more and more distinct over three interrogations, suggesting that a
single, small sample of behavior may not be sufficient to detect existing differences.
Extremely small sample sizes may also prevent differences in eye contact from
being detected. With the exception of Granhag and Stromwall (2002) who measured
behaviors at three times, studies finding differences typically use at least sixty
participants, whereas studies finding no differences often used sample sizes less than
thirty (e.g. Feeley & deTurck, 1998; McClintock & Hunt, 1975). However sample size
does not universally determine whether or not differences are detected, as some large
samples find no differences (e.g. Buller et al., 1989).
Smiles. The research on guilty smiles during deception has produced similarly
mixed results. Only rarely has deception been associated with an increase in smiling (e.g.,
Green, O’Hair, Cody, & Yen, 1985). More often studies have found a decrease in the
number of smiles exhibited in deceptive situations (Bond et al., 1985; Granhag &
Stromwall, 2002; McClintock & Hunt, 1975). However, the vast majority of research has
yielded no relation between smiling and deception (Bond et al., 1990; Buller et al., 1989;
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Buller & Aune; 1987; Knapp et al., 1974; Kraut, 1978; Kraut & Poe, 1980; Riggio &
Friedman, 1983; Stiff & Miller, 1986; Vrij, 1995; Vrij et al., 2000).
Ekman, Friesen and O’Sullivan (1988) proposed that the mixed results regarding
smiling as a correlate of deception could be explained by a failure to consider the
emotional and physiological components of different types of smiles, namely “felt
smiles” and “masking smiles” (p. 414, 415). According to Ekman and Friesen (1982), felt
smiles result when an individual experiences a positive emotion and are formed by the
movement of the zygomatic major muscle pulling the lip corners up toward the cheek and
the orbicularis oculi muscle raising the cheek and gathering the skin at the corner of the
eyes. In contrast, masking smiles involve micro expressions indicative of negative
emotion and compensatory efforts to activate the zygomatic major. Ekman et al. (1988)
studied the occurrence of felt and masking smiles in thirty-one female nursing students
during exposure to graphic trauma (e.g., amputations) and neutral video clips. Video clip
type was crossed with two communication conditions. In the truthful communication
condition, participants were asked to accurately describe their feelings while watching the
neutral video clip. In the deception condition, individuals were asked to describe feelings
opposite of those actually elicited by the graphic video. Results showed that the
occurrence of felt and masking smiles did distinguish between truthful and deceptive
conditions, in that the number of felt smiles significantly decreased, while the number of
masking smiles significantly increased during the deceptive condition.
Results of at least one study provide support for the notion that masking cues are
useful for the detection of deception (Fiedler & Walka, 1993). Specifically, half of the 72
male and female participants were educated on the usefulness of certain behavioral cues
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before watching videos of truthful and deceptive communication. Accuracy in deception
detection increased when individuals used the occurrence of masking smiles as an
indicator of deceit (Fiedler & Walka, 1993).
Blinking. Because engaging in lying behavior has been shown to be
physiologically arousing for most individuals (see, for example, deTurck & Miller,
1985), behaviors associated with arousal, such as blinking, may theoretically indicate
deception. However, clear conclusions on the effects of deception on blinking still have
not been reached. Most studies in this area have reported a significant increase in the
amount of blinking exhibited during deception (Chiba, 1985; Galin & Thorn, 1993; Hess
& Kleck, 1994), but this association has not been universally replicated (Bond et al.,
1990; deTurck & Miller, 1985; Stiff & Miller, 1986).
As with other cue discrepancies, it is possible that the sample size and the method
used to induce deception in studies finding no significant differences in blinking may
have had an effect on study outcome. Both deTurck and Miller (1985) and Stiff and
Miller (1986) used samples of less than twenty-five participants per condition, which
may have been too small to detect meaningful differences. Although Bond et al. (1985)
used a larger sample (N = 60), participants may have lacked the motivation theoretically
required to yield significant cues. In a study of American and Jordanian students, Bond et
al. (1985) had participants describe four people: someone they honestly liked, someone
they honestly disliked, someone they liked as if they disliked them, and someone they
disliked as if they liked them. Such a method may have been inadequate for simulating
real-world deception because it provided no consequence of failing to deceive.
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Body Cues
The second potential source of deception cues is found in the remainder of the
body. These cues can generally be divided into two categories: illustrators and adaptors.
Illustrators. Illustrators are arm and hand gestures that modify or supplement
verbal communications (Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Vrij, 2001). Recall that decreased
gesturing has been associated with increases in cognitive load (e.g. Ekman, 1997; Ekman
& Friesen, 1972) Because lying can be a cognitively complex task (Vrij, 2001), decreases
in illustrator use may be a reasonable marker of deception. Empirically, both decreases
(Buller & Aune, 1987; Green et al., 1985; Vrij et al., 2000) and increases (Bond et al.
1985; deTurck & Miller, 1985) in illustrator use have been demonstrated during
deception. Nevertheless, the majority of studies indicate no differences in gesturing
between liars and truth tellers (Bond et al., 1990; Buller et al., 1989; Feeley & deTurck,
1998; Granhag & Stromwall, 2002; Knapp et al., 1974; Kraut & Poe, 1980; McClintock
& Hunt, 1975; O’hair et al., 1981; Stiff & Miller, 1986; Vrij, 1995).
Again, the most striking problem within the deception literature is the frequent
use of small samples. Research finding increases in illustrator use have typically utilized
extremely small samples (N < 30), suggesting that samples may have been too small to
detect meaningful differences.
Adaptors. Adaptors are nervous or fidgeting behaviors involving the arms, legs,
hands, or feet (Knapp et al. 1974). Many empirical investigations suggest that adaptor use
increases during deceptive communication (e.g. deTurck & Miller, 1985; Fiedler &
Walka, 1993; Knapp et al., 1974; McClintock & Hunt, 1975; O’hair et al., 1981; Riggio
& Friedman, 1983), consistent with Ekman’s (1985; 1982) and Buller and Burgoon’s
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(1996) theory that the fear experienced during deception results in behaviors associated
with anxiety. In contrast, Buller & Aune (1987) and Granhag & Stromwall (2002)
actually found decreases in nervous behaviors during deceptive communications,
consistent with DePaulo’s (1992) and Zuckerman’s et al. (1981) theory that deceivers
attempt to control behaviors stereotypically associated with deception. However, a
number of studies have found no differences in adaptor use during deceptive
communications (e.g. Bond et al., 1985; Bond et al., 1990; Buller et al., 1989; Feeley &
deTurck, 1998; Heilveil & Muehleman, 1981; Kraut, 1978; Stiff & Miller, 1986; Vrij et
al., 2000). Again, small sample sizes were frequently used, which decreases the
likelihood that significant results would emerge. Also, studies rarely provided meaningful
motivation for subjects to successfully deceive, decreasing the likelihood that subjects
would yield clear cues.
Voice Cues
Because attempts at deception are often communicated verbally, vocal and verbal
cues comprise the third channel for potential indicators of deception. The majority of the
literature has found that deceptive communicators take longer to respond than honest
communicators, and that their responses are shorter, higher in pitch, and filled with more
errors and hesitations (e.g. Anolli & Ciceri, 1997; Buller et al., 1989; deTurck & Miller;
1985; Ekman et al., 1991; Feeley & deTurck, 1998; Fiedler & Walka, 1993; Heilveil &
Muehleman, 1981; Kraut, 1978; Motley, 1974; Streeter, Krauss, Geller, Olson, & Apple,
1977; Vrij et al., 2000). However empirical evidence exists that these cues do not
universally differentiate honest from deceptive communication (e.g. Kraut & Poe, 1980;
Riggio & Friedman, 1983; Stiff & Miller, 1986).
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Linguistic Cues
Unlike other speech cues, verbal cues such as plausibility, have been found to
powerfully discriminate between honest and deceptive communication (Kraut, 1978;
Riggio & Friedman, 1983; Stiff & Miller, 1986) In a study of college undergraduates
participating in mock job interviews, Kraut (1978) found that plausibility was the single
best predictor of a participant’s veracity during the interview. Similarly, in a study of
sixty-three undergraduates describing pictures in a truthful or untruthful manner, Riggio
and Friedman (1983) found that plausibility could be reliably used to detect deception in
a mock crime scenario, as the truthful communicators were consistently rated as more
plausible than their deceptive counterparts.
A statement’s plausibility in part depends on the quantity of details given. In a
study of sixty undergraduates giving false, partially false, or true alibis, Porter and Yuille
(1996) found that number of details given was also a powerful indicator of veracity, as
participants in the truthful condition gave significantly more details than participants in
any of the deception conditions. In a review of the literature, Vrij (2000) noted that the
majority of studies have found that truthful participants give more details when
communicating than deceptive participants, and a meta-analysis (N = 883) by DePaulo et
al. (2003) supported the observation that liars provide significantly fewer details than
those telling the truth.
Because verbal indicators, such as plausibility and detail quantity, most reliably
discriminate between truthful and deceptive communications, it is reasonable to consider
the function of other aspects of verbal communication during deception. As mentioned
earlier, the many definitions of deception, for both humans and non-humans alike, allude
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to two fundamentally different types of deception based on the method used to deliver
deception: leaving out true information (lies of omission), and generating false
information (lies of commission). Because these two methods of deceiving involve
contrasting tasks, it is ostensible that they may differentially encounter deception
obstacles, such as cognitive complexity, emotion, arousal and stereotypes, and therefore
may yield different behavioral correlates. However, no published study to date has
examined this possibility. Recall that, using a novel laboratory paradigm, Ratliff et al.
(2006, unpublished manuscript) found that only four participants in the deception
condition (N = 63) engaged in lies of commission while deceptively describing a crime
scene. The remainder of deceptive participants engaged in lies of omission while
deceptively describing the scene. However, the small number of lies of commission did
not allow for meaningful behavioral comparisons. Hence, the purpose of the present
study is to investigate the behavioral correlates of deception during lies of omission and
commission.
Empirical evidence does suggest that distinctions between other types of lies
result in unique behavioral displays. For example, Feely and deTurck (1998) drew a
distinction between sanctioned and unsanctioned deception. According to Feely and
deTurck (1998) sanctioned deception involves participants being instructed or given
permission to lie, whereas unsanctioned deception involves participants who lie without
being told to do so. In a study of 212 undergraduates who either were or were not
expressly told to lie, unsanctioned deceivers (who were not expressly told to lie) used
fewer adaptors, exhibited less eye contact and made fewer speech errors and speech
hesitations than sanctioned deceivers (Feely & deTurck, 1998). Given that deception
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method is such an intuitive distinction, it is logical to assume that manipulating deception
tasks to induce lies of omission and commission might also result in unique behavioral
displays.
The Current Study
Based on the literature to date, it is reasonable to posit that patterns of behavioral
correlates may discriminate between lies of omission and lies of commission.
Accordingly, this study provided task instructions that induced either lies of omission or
commission. Resulting behavioral manifestations were observed under controlled
laboratory conditions. It was expected that the behavior patterns exhibited during lies of
omission would differ from those exhibited during lies of commission.
It was hypothesized that the participants asked to engage in lies of commission
would experience the most emotional discomfort managing the more cognitively complex
task. Therefore, it was predicted that they would exhibit significantly more adaptors,
speech hesitations and errors, and longer response latencies than participants who were
asked to engage in lies of omission. It was also expected that individuals in both lie
conditions would experience more emotional discomfort compared to a baseline period in
which they were not instructed to lie and would therefore exhibit more adaptors, speech
hesitations and errors, and longer response latencies when instructed to lie than when not
instructed to lie. Given that leaving pertinent information out would intuitively be
associated with the presence of fewer details, it was expected that that participants who
were asked to engage in lies of omission would generate less information in their
statements, and therefore exhibit shorter responses than participants asked to engage in
lies of commission.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
Volunteers were recruited to participate in a study titled “Processes in building
relationships.” This study title was used to mask the true purpose of the study, and to
provide a cover task for the paradigm used to elicit deception behaviors. A total of 126
undergraduate students participated in this study. The first 15 participants were used to
pilot a novel task designed to elicit lies of omission and commission, and these data were
excluded from final results. From the final sample, data from six participants were
excluded because they failed to lie during the deception phase. Of the remaining 105
participants, 80 were women and 25 were men. Ages ranged from 18-26 years (M = 20.2,
SD = 1.6). 48.6% of participants identified as African-American, 48.1% identified at
Caucasian, 1.9% identified as Hispanic, and 1.9% identified as Pacific Islander.
Participants received credit in psychology courses in exchange for participation. The
procedures and consent process used for the study were approved by the University of
Southern Mississippi Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects.
Measures
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
To assess levels of anxiety and stress, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales
(DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995; Appendix A) was administered shortly after
completion of the deception task. The DASS is a 42-item measure of emotional states
related to depression, anxiety and stress. Each of the three scales contains 14 items. Each
scale is scored on a 4-point Likert-like scale with responses ranging from did not apply to
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me at all to applied to me very much or most of the time. Each item is rated as to how
much it applied to the individual over the past week. In a normative sample of a student
population, Lovibond and Lovibond (1995) found a mean depression score of 6.34 (SD =
6.97), a mean anxiety score of 4.70 (SD = 4.91), and a mean stress score of 10.11 (SD =
7.91), whereas in a general adult population, Crawford & Henry (2003) found slightly
lower means, with a mean depression score of 5.55 (SD = 7.48), an a mean anxiety score
of 3.56 (SD = 5.39), and a mean stress score of 9.27 (SD = 8.04). Lovibond and Lovibond
(1995) found reliability of the DASS using Chronbach’s Alpha was .91 for the depression
scale, .84 for the anxiety scale, and .90 for the stress scale in a student population,
whereas Crawford and Henry (2003) found its reliability to be .95, .93, and .97 for
depression, anxiety and stress respectively in their general adult population. Evidence for
the DASS’s construct validity has been reported (e.g., Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995;
Antony et al., 1998; Brown et al., 1997; Clara, Cox, & Enns, 2001; Crawford & Henry,
2003).
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participant was seated in a room by him- or
herself and written informed consent was obtained. The participant was then told that the
purpose of the study was to investigate the factors influencing relationship formation in
situations in which face-to-face contact is neither possible nor desirable. For the task the
participant was told he or she would be partnered with a couple (man and woman)
involved in a romantic relationship. While waiting for further instructions, the participant
was told that they could observe the couple in a waiting room by watching a video
monitor linked to a camera hidden in the ceiling. The video feed the participant thought
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they were viewing was actually a videotaped interaction between two confederates
pretending to be girlfriend and boyfriend.
At the beginning of the couple’s interaction, one of the confederates (Confederate
1) was alone in the room placing a cell phone call to someone who was clearly not his or
her significant other. Confederate 1 was heard making clandestine romantic plans with
the person on the phone when Confederate 2, the significant other, arrived. Confederate 1
quickly ended the phone call. At that point in the video the researcher entered the scene.
The researcher explained that another participant had been monitoring the couple as they
waited via a small camera hidden in the ceiling. Confederate 1 responded by looking
appropriately stricken. To increase the ecological validity of the task and to promote
identification with the aggrieved member of the couple, Confederate 1 was always the
opposite gender from the participant, and Confederate 2 was always the same gender as
the participant.
The researcher next escorted the confederates off camera, ostensibly to a room
adjacent to the participant. The researcher next returned to the participant, turned off the
monitor, and proceeded to tell the participant the following details about the task. A
rigged lottery was first performed to assign the various roles involved in the study (i.e.
interviewer, interviewee and observer) to the participant and the two confederates. The
participant always drew the role of interviewee, and was told that he or she would answer
questions asked by the interviewer so the interviewer could get to know them. The
interviewer always happened to be Confederate 2, the member of the couple who was of
the same gender as the participant.
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Confederate 1 (the unfaithful member of the couple) was assigned the role of
observer. The observer provided instructions to the participant about how to answer the
interviewer’s questions to help the interviewer in their assigned task to get to know the
participant. These instructions were written down by the observer and delivered to the
participant in an envelope. The participant was told that no one but the observer and the
participant would have access to these written instructions.
The interviewer also purportedly wrote a list of questions to ask the participant
that was read to the participant by the experimenter over an intercom from a third room in
the laboratory. A video camera was placed facing the participant, and the participant was
told that the interviewer would be able to see the participant on a video monitor using this
camera as the questions were read, just as the participant was able to see the interviewer
earlier. Although the true purpose of the video camera was to record participant’s
behavior during the task, the presence of the video camera also served decrease the
impersonality of the task as participants were led to believe that looking into the camera
would create the impression of looking into the interviewer’s eyes.
After providing these task instructions, the researcher excused herself to retrieve
the envelope containing the instructions from the observer. The participant was randomly
assigned to receive one of two sets of observer response instructions (see Appendix B.)
One set of instruction facilitated lies by omission (e.g., Just say you don’t really know) if
the interviewer (Confederate 1) asked the participant about the cell phone call observed
on the video. The second facilitated lies by commission (e.g., Just say I was talking to my
mom). When the researcher returned, the envelope was given to the participant with
directions to read its contents.
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The participant was asked if they had any last minute questions, and then the
video recorder was started. The researcher excused herself to read the interviewer
questions over the intercom from an adjoining room. There were nine interviewer
questions asked beginning with six innocuous questions intended to elicit baseline
responses unrelated to the instruction to lie, followed by three questions intended to elicit
deceptive responses (see Appendix C). Specifically, the first two questions were neutral
questions, the next three questions were questions designed to elicit a baseline response
for comparison to the deception questions. The sixth question was another neutral
question, and the last three questions were the questions related to the instructions to lie.
After the final question was asked the researcher explained that the time limit for
questioning had elapsed and that she would meet with each subject shortly.
The researcher returned to participant room, stopped the video recording and gave
the participant a post-task questionnaire designed to measure participants adherence to
the task instructions, understanding of their task and level of discomfort following the
task (see Appendix D) and the DASS (see Appendix A). Any participant who rated
discomfort with the task at a 7 or higher on a Likert scale from 1 (barely noticeable) to 10
(extreme discomfort) were immediately and fully debriefed. Any participant who rated
their discomfort with the task at a 6 or lower were debriefed following the completion of
data collection to maintain study integrity.
Target Behaviors
The behaviors measured included eye contact, blinking, adaptor use, illustrator
use, pausing, speech errors, response latency and total response time. These were
operationalized as follows:
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Eye Contact. Eye contact referred to the total amount of time, in seconds, that the
participant spent gazing at the camera or the interviewer.
Blinking. Blinking referred to the total number of eye blinks exhibited during the
interview.
Adaptors. Adaptors referred to movements in which the fingers, hands, legs, or
feet manipulate foreign objects, clothing, or parts of the body. Adaptors will also include
psychomotor agitation of the fingers, hands, legs or feet.
Illustrators. Illustrators referred to hand or arm movements used to illustrate
speech.
Speech pauses. Speech pauses referred to the total time, in seconds, that a
participant spent silent, and/or filled silence with utterances such as ah, um, er, uh, and
hmmm.
Speech errors. Speech errors referred to grammatical errors, incomplete
sentences, slips of the tongue and incoherent sounds.
Response latency. Response latency referred to the average time, in seconds, a
participant took to begin responding once the interviewer had completed the question.
Total Response Time. Total Response Time referred to the total time spent
responding, minus pauses.
Behavioral Ratings
Using the data of four participants from a pilot study, two adult volunteer raters
were trained to 90% agreement on the presence of the behavioral variables of interest.
Raters were kept completely blind to the variables of interest in relation to the behaviors
they were measuring. They were completely unaware of the purpose of the study and had
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no knowledge regarding the presence of baseline and deception conditions, or omission
and commission conditions. To measure the behaviors of interest, amount of target
behaviors exhibited was assessed beginning immediately after the interviewer asked each
question, and concluded when the participant finished his or her response to each
question.
Vocal cues, including total response time, speech pauses, speech errors and
response latency were measured from the audio portion of the videotaped descriptions.
Speech pauses during each condition were timed in seconds with a stopwatch and divided
by the total response time to give a percentage of time spent pausing. Speech errors were
counted. Response latency was timed with a stopwatch, beginning at the end of the
interviewer’s question and ending when the participant began answering.
Non-vocal cues, including duration of eye contact and use of adaptors and
illustrators were also assessed and timed in seconds. Each of those behaviors was then
divided by the amount of total response time, to give a percentage of time spent engaging
in each of these behaviors during each condition. Eye blinks were counted during each
condition.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Means, standard deviations and measures of skew and kurtosis were computed for
all behavioral correlates for the within subjects baseline (i.e. no instruction to lie) and lie
conditions and the post-task Depression, Anxiety and Stress scales of the DASS (Table
1). Chi square tests or independent sample t-tests were performed in order to determine if
the participants in the two deception conditions differed as a function of age, gender,
ethnicity or marital status. The deception conditions did not differ with respect to these
variables.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure
n
M
SD
Skew
Kurtosis
_______________________________________________________________________
Response Time
Baseline
105
13.71
8.86
1.74
4.84
Lie
105
8.34
5.53
1.70
3.39
Response Latency
Baseline
Lie

105
105

1.47
2.21

0.51
1.11

1.51
1.79

0.95
4.52

Speech Errors
Baseline
Lie

105
105

0.57
2.74

1.55
4.53

3.01
1.61

9.52
1.81

Adaptors
Baseline
105
0.59
0.38
-.024
-1.54
Lie
105
0.48
0.40
0.17
-1.57
_______________________________________________________________________
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Table 1 (continued).
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure
n
M
SD
Skew
Kurtosis
_______________________________________________________________________
Pausing
Baseline
105
0.06
0.07
1.05
0.25
Lie
105
0.12
0.12
0.65
-0.51
Eye Contact
Baseline
Lie

105
105

0.20
0.18

0.26
0.26

1.32
1.46

0.92
1.28

Illustrators
Baseline
Lie

105
105

0.03
0.01

0.07
0.05

4.03
4.42

18.07
20.93

Blinking
Baseline
Lie

98
98

96.02
102.03

51.88
58.65

2.25
1.37

10.31
2.67

DASS
Depression
105
6.30
7.76
1.83
3.04
Anxiety
105
6.08
6.40
1.27
1.13
Stress
105
9.91
8.54
0.82
-0.08
_______________________________________________________________________
Note. DASS = Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale.

Deception Condition and DASS Scores
Gender was not included in the analyses reported, as some of the cells would be
rather small (as little as n = 8), especially for men. Three separate one-way analyses of
variance were conducted to determine if participants in the omission and commission lie
conditions differed in their levels of DASS anxiety, depression or stress scale scores
(Table 2). No differences between groups were found for depression or anxiety; however,
significant between group differences emerged between the two deception conditions on
the DASS Stress Scale. Stress scores were significantly higher in the commission
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condition (M = 11.79, SD = 9.10) than in the omission condition (M = 8.00, SD = 7.54),
F(1, 104) = 5.39, p < .05.
Table 2
DASS Scores between Lie Conditions
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

F

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Depression
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

43.65
6210.60
6254.25

1
103
104

43.65
60.30

0.72

Anxiety
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

49.27
4214.12
4263.39

1
103
104

49.27
40.91

1.20

Stress
377.51
1
377.51
5.40*
Between Groups
7208.72
103
69.99
Within Groups
7586.23
104
Total
_______________________________________________________________________
Note. DASS = Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale.
*p < .05

Behavioral Correlates
To evaluate whether the omission and commission groups differed with respect to
behavioral cues during the baseline no instruction to lie condition, separate one-way
analyses of variance were conducted (Table 3). No significant differences emerged from
these analyses.
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Table 3
Analyses of Variance of Behavioral Correlates at Baseline
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure

Sum of
df
Mean Square
F
Squares
_____________________________________________________________________________
Response Time
Between Groups
1.77
1
1.77
0.03
Within Groups
7450.15
103
72.33
Total
7451.92
104
Response Latency
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

0.40
26.84
27.24

1
103
104

0.40
0.26

1.53

Errors
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

0.04
249.58
249.61

1
103
104

0.04
2.42

0.02

Adaptors
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

0.05
15.03
15.07

1
103
104

0.05
0.15

0.31

Pauses
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

0.001
0.46
0.46

1
103
104

0.001
0.004

0.21

Eye Contact
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

0.10
6.88
6.98

1
103
104

0.10
0.07

1.44

Illustrators
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

0.01
0.56
0.58

1
103
104

0.01
0.01

1.23

Blinks
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

3038.52
258027.42
261065.94

1
96
97

3038.52
2687.79

1.13

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note. All results non-significant at p = .05.
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To evaluate the effects of lying on behavior, two (baseline or deception) by two
(omission lie or commission lie) mixed-model analyses of variance with repeated
measures for the baseline/deception condition were computed separately for the eight
behavioral correlates of interest: response time, response latency, time spent pausing,
number of speech errors, use of adaptors, use of illustrators, amount of eye contact and
amount of blinking (Table 4). A significant main effect of instruction condition (baseline
versus deception) was found. Participants exhibited shorter response times when lying (M
= 8.34, SD = 5.53) compared to responses given in the baseline condition in which they
were not instructed to lie (M = 13.84, SD = 8.47), F(1, 103) = 67.23, p < .001. They also
exhibited longer response latencies (M = 2.21, SD = 1.11) when lying compared to the
baseline condition where they were not told to lie (M = 1.47, SD = 0.51), F(1, 103) =
67.23, p < .001. Participants committed more speech errors when lying (M = 2.74, SD =
4.53) than when not instructed to lie (M = 0.57, SD = 1.55), F(1, 103) = 21.45, p < .001.
They also spent a greater percentage of time pausing when lying (M = 0.12, SD = 0.12)
than they did in the baseline condition where they were not instructed to lie (M = 0.06,
SD = 0.07), F(1, 103) = 23.79, p < .001. Finally, participants spent a smaller percentage
of time exhibiting adaptors when lying (M = 0.48, SD = 0.40) than they did during the
baseline condition where they were not instructed to lie (M = 0.59, SD = 0.38), F(1, 103)
= 9.45, p < .01. There were no significant differences found for eye contact, illustrator
use or blinking between truth and lie conditions. No main effects or interaction effects
were found for type of lie told (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations for the
Omission and Commission groups).
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Table 4
Analyses of Variance of Behavioral Correlates as a function of Baseline/Deception and
Omission/Commission
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Partial eta²

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Response Time
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

26.34
7778.72
1586.40
10.56
2814.25

1
103
1
1
103

26.34
75.52
1586.40
10.56
27.32

Response Latency
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

1.26
109.70
28.66
0.05
43.90

1
103
1
1
103

1.26
1.07
28.66
0.05
0.42

Speech Errors
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

7.65
1177.71
247.26
6.21
1187.09

1
103
1
1
103

7.65
11.43
247.26
6.21
11.53

Adaptors
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

0.001
24.72
0.61
0.70
6.60

1
103
1
1
103

0.001
0.24
0.61
0.70
0.06

Pausing
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

0.01
1.03
0.22
0.02
0.95

1
103
1
1
103

0.01
0.01
0.22
0.02
0.01

0.35

.003

58.06***
0.39

.36
.004

1.81

.01

67.23***
.12

.40
.001

0.67

.01

21.45***
0.54

.17
.01

0.005

.000

9.45**
1.10

.08
.01

0.80

.01

23.79***
1.93

.000
.17

_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 4 (continued).
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Partial eta²

_______________________________________________________________________
Eye Contact
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

0.13
11.54
0.01
0.01
2.51

1
103
1
1
103

0.13
0.11
0.01
0.01
0.02

1.15

.01

0.49
0.26

.01
.002

Illustrators
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

0.004
0.47
0.01
0.003
0.35

1
103
1
1
103

0.004
0.01
0.01
0.003
0.003

0.81

.01

2.03
0.96

.02
.01

Blinking
O/C
Error
B/L
O/C x B/L
Error

3865.59
436134.42
1298.17
432.70
142119.77

1
93
1
1
93

3865.59
4689.62
1298.17
432.70
1528.17

0.82

.01

0.85
0.28

.01
.003

_____________________________________________________________________________________
**p < .01, ***p < .00 1
Note: O/C = Omission versus commission between group comparison. B/L = Baseline versus lie
(deception) within group comparison. O/C x B/L = interaction between the omission/commission variables
and baseline/lie (deception) variables.

Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Behavioral Correlates of Omission and Commission
Lies
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure

n

M

SD

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Response Time
Omission
Commission

52
53

8.92
7.76

5.33
5.71

Response Latency
Omission
Commission

52
53

2.31
2.13

1.12
1.10

_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5 (continued).
_______________________________________________________________________
Measure

n

M

SD

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Speech Errors
Omission
Commission

52
53

3.10
2.38

5.12
3.81

Adaptors
Omission
Commission

52
53

0.47
0.50

0.38
0.41

Pausing
Omission
Commission

52
53

0.11
0.14

0.12
0.12

Eye Contact
Omission
Commission

52
53

0.16
0.20

0.27
0.26

Illustrators
Omission
Commission

52
53

0.01
0.01

0.04
0.05

Blinking
Omission
Commission

47
48

105.06
99.06

61.83
55.85

_____________________________________________________________________________________
Note: All differences non-significant.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to compare the behavioral correlates of deception
during lies of omission and lies of commission. No significant differences were found
between behaviors of participants who lied by leaving information out versus participants
who lied by generating false information; however participants in the commission
condition did report more stress during the past week than participants in the omission
condition.
Several factors may have contributed to the lack of significant differences in
behavior. It is possible the behaviors associated with deception are consistent no matter
what type of lie is being told. However, it is also possible that lying is not behaviorally
similar across the board, and that the lack of differences noted here were due to the
particular methods used to elicit lies of omission and lies of commission. Further, the
higher levels of stress reported on the DASS by participants in the commission condition
may evidence a different type of distinction between lies of omission and lies of
commission, if not behaviorally then perhaps experientially. Although post-task stress
levels cannot be directly attributed to the deception task, as the DASS items refer to stress
experienced over the past week rather than in the immediate past, this result may indicate
that lying by generating false information is more stressful than simply leaving
information out.
Regarding the lack of significant differences in behaviors between the omission
and commission conditions, several factors related to the methods used to elicit lies of
omission and lies of commission in the present study may have significantly impacted the
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likelihood of detecting behavioral differences. The first factor to consider is that the
present study observed only a very small sample of behavior. In order to standardize the
method across participants, only certain questions were asked in a certain order.
Participants had the option to give extremely brief answers and were not pressed for more
details. Had they been required to answer more questions and keep the ruse going,
behavioral differences may have begun to emerge between the two deception conditions.
Consistent with this possibility, a meta-analysis by DePaulo et al. (2003) found that
longer interactions do appear to lead to more pronounced cues.
Also, the present study employed an interpersonal paradigm with very little
motivation to lie. At best, participants in the present study were faced with the potential
of hurting someone’s feelings and possibly being caught in an awkward social situation;
this may have constituted deception consistent with what DePaulo et al. (2004) termed
“little lies” (p. 148). Even lies that are generally considered inconsequential are still
associated with a noticeable amount of discomfort (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and
although this discomfort can provide motivation to lie, which can disrupt performance
(Baumeister, 1998), it seems unlikely that omission and commission lies would result in
differing levels of motivation, and hence no significant differences in behaviors
associated with motivation under the current circumstances. DePaulo et al. (2003) noted
that unmotivated deception leaves almost no recognizable cues. Differences may have
emerged had a deception paradigm posing more significant consequences for detected
deception been used.
Further, in this study participants were told how to lie (i.e. to use omission or
commission), but, perhaps more importantly, they were also told specifically what to say.
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A lie of commission involves generating false information, whereas a lie of omission
only requires that pertinent information is left out; however, the particular method
employed in the present study may have inadvertently made the nature of the omission
and commission tasks indistinguishable. Consistent with DePaulo et al.’s (2003) finding
that pre-packaged lies were associated with shorter and less detailed deception responses
than truthful responses, differences in response length between the baseline and deception
conditions were found, but not between the omission and commission conditions. By
telling participants specifically what to say both during the omission and commission
conditions, behaviors commonly associated with more cognitively complex tasks, such as
increased pausing, response latencies, and limited use of gestures may have been
attenuated to produce no significant differences between the type of lie told.
Given the shortcomings of this study, several areas for future research are offered.
First, developing a method of inducing lies of omission and lies of commission without
expressly telling the participant how to lie might result in increased arousal and
discomfort. Further, a method that allows participants to come up with their own specific
lie of omission or commission would ostensibly result in greater cognitive complexity
and potentially more pronounced differences in behaviors. Future studies should also use
a method allowing for longer observation of behavior to increase the likelihood that
behaviors would emerge if they exist.
Despite this study’s failure to find behavioral differences between lies of omission
and lies of commission, the results are consistent with the body of evidence suggesting
that behavioral differences do exist between ostensibly deceptive and non-deceptive
conduct. Regardless of the type of lie told, deceptive responses were shorter and
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associated with longer response latencies than responses given when participants had no
instruction or reason to lie during the baseline observations, consistent with the tenet that
deception is more arousing and cognitively complex than telling the truth. In this study,
the variation of cognitive complexity between baseline and deception was simple. For the
baseline condition participants were asked to speak on a subject they knew very well:
themselves. In the deception condition, which always followed the truth condition,
participants had to recognize that the new question pertained to the instructions they
received earlier in the task, and they had to remember what the instructions said to do so
that they could respond in the acceptable manner. They also had to decide to comply with
the instructions. These additional steps likely added time to the promptness of their
responses. In addition, the lesser degree of familiarity with the interaction they had
observed earlier compared to the degree of familiarity they had with the subject matter of
the non-deception baseline questions likely made it more difficult to come up with
information to include in their responses. Even more simply, the longer response
latencies and shorter responses demonstrated during the deception condition may have
been associated with the level of discomfort experienced, which may have made
participants more reticent to engage in the behavior and to try to finish as quickly as
possible.
Similarly, the increased pausing and more frequent speech errors associated with
the deception condition may have been related to arousal experienced during the
deception task (deTurck & Miller, 1985). However, it also could have ostensibly been
related to interference caused by participants trying to remember what to say and what
not to say during the deception conditions. Such interference was likely considerably less
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in response to the questions designed to elicit what should have been truthful responses.
It is worthwhile to point out that whether or not the participant was telling the truth in the
baseline condition was not confirmed.
The final behavioral indicator that distinguished truthful from deceptive responses
was the use of fidgety movements called adaptors. Although research indicates these
behaviors are often seen more frequently during deception than truth (e.g. deTurck &
Miller, 1985; Fiedler & Walka, 1993; Knapp et al., 1974; McClintock & Hunt, 1975;
O’hair et al., 1981; Riggio & Friedman, 1983), fidgeting is often stereotypically
associated with deception (DePaulo, 1992; Zuckerman et al., 1981). In an effort to appear
as stereotypically truthful as possible, participants may have been purposely attempting to
decrease their fidgeting when telling lies; therefore, making it less likely that their
behavior might give rise to their knowledge and result in a drawn out series of
uncomfortable questioning.
This study served to add to the increasing body of literature supporting the
presence of differing behavioral indicators during deceptive and non-deceptive
interactions; however, it also added to the inconsistencies within that body. This seems to
beg the question regarding the role of interpersonal variables in deception behavior.
Whereas the majority of the literature has focused on situational or circumstantial
variables, turning to the role of individual characteristics may shed light on the
discrepancies that continue to arise. Specifically, personality variables such as
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, conscientiousness, intelligence level
and locus of control may ostensibly be the moderating variables responsible for the
discrepancies in the deception literature. Given their tendency to experience higher levels
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of negative emotion (Digman, 1990), individuals high on neuroticism may be more
susceptible to the effects of anxiety on behavior during deceptive interaction. Individuals
higher on agreeableness, who tend to avoid contention (Digman, 1990), may be more
comfortable deceiving if it means maintaining calm and cohesion, especially in situations
involving white lies aimed at not hurting another’s feelings. Imagination and creativeness
associated with individuals higher on openness (Digman, 1990) may impact one’s ability
to generate a plausible and believable response. An internal locus of control, which is
generally associated with a better effort and ability to control one’s own behavior (Rotter,
1975), may be associated with fewer behavioral indicators commonly but incorrectly
associated with deception, such as fidgeting, smiling, and lack of eye contact. Higher
levels of social intelligence may also be associated with variation in deception cues, as
individuals who are better able to assess another’s level of suspicion and modify their
behavior accordingly may seem more natural (Zaccaro, Gilbert, Thor, & Mumford, 1991)
whether deceiving or telling the truth. Further investigation into these possibilities would
likely be the logical next step in the field of deception behavior research.
Limitations and Future Directions
As with many studies, a relatively small sample size may have contributed to this
study’s findings and a larger sample size may have led to detectable differences in
behavior between the omission and commission groups. Future research into the potential
differences between lies of omission and lies of commission, would also likely benefit
from the development of a paradigm that provides significant motivation to lie
successfully, that allows participants to decide what deception strategy to use and how to
word it, and that stimulates longer responses in both truthful and deceptive conditions.
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Researchers may wish to use an additional control group in which no encouragement to
lie is given; this may provide a better comparison between groups, as the deception
literature to date almost universally uses paradigms in which participants receive a
stimulus to lie, then proceed to the truthful or deception condition. In repeated measure
designs in this research area, truth conditions almost always precede deception
conditions. A control group may provide some means to counterbalance conditions, as
the tasks could be given in any order and the expectation to engage in deception would
potentially not influence behavior during a no-deception phase.
Future research into deception behaviors may also benefit from the use of more
psychophysiological measurement techniques, such as fMRI or voice stress analysis.
Such measures record generally involuntary responses that are less amenable to
impression management efforts. Use of adjunct psychophysiological measures would
provide a useful multi-modal approach to examining the sequence of events involved in
both conscious and non-conscious information processing associated with deception.
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APPENDIX A
DEPRESSION ANXIETY STRESS SCALES (DASS)
DASS
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the
statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0
1
2
3

Did not apply to me at all
Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1

I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things

0

1

2

3

2

I was aware of dryness of my mouth

0

1

2

3

3

I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all

0

1

2

3

4

I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid
breathing, breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)

0

1

2

3

5

I just couldn't seem to get going

0

1

2

3

6

I tended to over-react to situations

0

1

2

3

7

I had a feeling of shakiness (eg, legs going to give way)

0

1

2

3

8

I found it difficult to relax

0

1

2

3

9

I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was
most relieved when they ended

0

1

2

3

10

I felt that I had nothing to look forward to

0

1

2

3

11

I found myself getting upset rather easily

0

1

2

3

12

I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy

0

1

2

3

13

I felt sad and depressed

0

1

2

3

14

I found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way
(eg, lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting)

0

1

2

3

15

I had a feeling of faintness

0

1

2

3

16

I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything

0

1

2

3

17

I felt I wasn't worth much as a person

0

1

2

3

18

I felt that I was rather touchy

0

1

2

3

19

I perspired noticeably (eg, hands sweaty) in the absence of
high temperatures or physical exertion

0

1

2

3
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Reminder of rating scale:
0
1
2
3

Did not apply to me at all
Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
Applied to me very much, or most of the time

20

I felt scared without any good reason

0

1

2

3

21

I felt that life wasn't worthwhile

0

1

2

3

22

I found it hard to wind down

0

1

2

3

23

I had difficulty in swallowing

0

1

2

3

24

I couldn't seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did

0

1

2

3

25

I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)

0

1

2

3

26

I felt down-hearted and blue

0

1

2

3

27

I found that I was very irritable

0

1

2

3

28

I felt I was close to panic

0

1

2

3

29

I found it hard to calm down after something upset me

0

1

2

3

30

I feared that I would be "thrown" by some trivial but
unfamiliar task

0

1

2

3

31

I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything

0

1

2

3

32

I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing

0

1

2

3

33

I was in a state of nervous tension

0

1

2

3

34

I felt I was pretty worthless

0

1

2

3

35

I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with
what I was doing

0

1

2

3

36

I felt terrified

0

1

2

3

37

I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about

0

1

2

3

38

I felt that life was meaningless

0

1

2

3

39

I found myself getting agitated

0

1

2

3

40

I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make
a fool of myself

0

1

2

3

41

I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands)

0

1

2

3

42

I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things

0

1

2

3
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APPENDIX B
DECEPTION CONDITION INSTRUCTIONS
Omission Instructions
If my girlfriend/boyfriend asks who I was on the phone with just say you don’t
really know.
Commission Instructions
If my girlfriend/boyfriend asks who I was on the phone with tell them I was
talking to my mom/dad.
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APPENDIX C
BASELINE PHASE AND DECEPTION PHASE QUESTIONS
Neutral Questions:
1. What is your participant number?
2. Where are you from?
Baseline Truth questions:
3. What is your major?
4. Why did you choose that major?
5. Do you like USM?
Neutral question:
6. What made you want to go to school here?
Deception questions:
7. When I first walked into the waiting room my boy/girlfriend was on the phone.
Who did it sound like (s)he was talking to?
8. What was (s)he saying?
9. Did (s)he sound at all like (s)he was talking to a boy/girl (s)he might be interested
in?
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APPENDIX D
POST-TASK QUESTIONNAIRE
Age: _____
Date of Birth: ____________
Gender: M or F

(circle one)

Ethnicity: ____________
Handedness: R or L
Marital Status: Married

(circle one)

Divorced

Single

Widowed

(circle one)

1. How upsetting did you find the task you performed?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

not
upsetting
at all

10

(circle one)

extremely
upsetting

2. Now that the study is over, how much discomfort are you currently experiencing as a
result of the experiment?
1
no
discomfort

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

(circle one)

much
discomfort

3. At anytime during the experiment, were you asked anything that made you
uncomfortable?
YES or NO (circle one)
4. If you answered YES to the previous question, what were you asked?
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APPENDIX E
IRB APPROVAL LETTER

51
REFERENCES
Akehurst, L., Kohnken, G.,Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (1996). Lay persons’ and police officers’
beliefs regarding deceptive behavior. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10, 461-471.
Anolli, L. & Ciceri, R. (1997). The voice of deception: vocal strategies of naïve and able
liars. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 21, 259-284.
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998).
Psychometric properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the Depression
Anxiety Stress Scales in clinical groups and a community sample. Psychological
Assessment, 10, 893-897.
Baumeister, R.F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.)
Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 680-740). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Bond, C. F., Kahler, K. N., & Paolicelli, L. M. (1985). The miscommunication of
deception: an adaptive perspective. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
21, 331-335.
Bond, C. F., Omar, A., Mahmoud, A., & Bonser, R. N. (1990). Lie detection across
cultures. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 1, 189-204.
Brown, T. A., Chorpita, B. F., Korotitsch, W., & Barlow, D. H. (1997). Psychometric
properties of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) in clinical samples.
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35, 79-89.
Buller, D. B. & Aune, R. K. (1987). Nonverbal cues to deception among intimates,
friends, and strangers. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 11, 269-290.
Buller, D. B. & Burgoon, J. K. (1996). Interpersonal deception theory. Communication
Theory, 6, 203-242.

52
Buller, D. B., Comstock, J., Aune, R. K., & Strzysewski, K. D. (1989). The effect of
probing on deceivers and truth tellers. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 13, 155170.
Chiba, H. (1985). Analysis of controlling facial expression when experiencing negative
affect on an anatomical basis. Journal of Human Development, 21, 22-29.
Clara, I. P., Cox, B. J., & Enns, M. W. (2001) Confirmatory factor analysis of the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales in depressed and anxious patients. Journal of
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 23, 61-67.
Crawford, J. R. & Henry, J. D. (2003).The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS):
Normative data and latent structure in a large non-clinical sample. British Journal
of Clinical Psychology, 42, 111-131.
DePaulo, B. M. (1992). Nonverbal behavior and self-presentation. Psychological
Bulletin, 111, 203-243.
DePaulo, B. M. (2004). The many faces of lies. In A. G. Miller (Ed.), The social
psychology of good and evil (pp. 303-326). NY: Guilford.
DePaulo, B. M., Ansfield, M. E., Kirkendol, S. E., Boden, J. M. (2004). Serious Lies.
Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 26 (2 & 3), 147-167.
DePaulo, B. M. & Kashy, D. A. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 63-79.
DePaulo, B. M., Stone, J. I., & Lassiter, G. D. (1985). Deceiving and detecting deceit. In
B.R. Schenkler (Ed.), The self and social power (pp. 323-370). New York:
McGraw-Hill.

53
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Mulehbruck, L., Charlton, K., &
Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-118.
deTurck, M. A. & Miller, G. R. (1985). Deception and arousal: isolating the behavioral
correlates of deception. Human Communication Research, 12, 181-201.
Ekman, P. (1985, 1992). Telling lies: Clues to deceit in the marketplace, politics, and
marriage. NewYork: Norton.
Ekman, P. (1988). Lying and nonverbal behavior: Theoretical issues and new findings.
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 12, 163-176.
Ekman, P. (1997). Deception, lying and demeanor. In D. F. Halpern & A. E.
Voiskounsky (Eds.), States of mind: American and post-Soviet perspectives on
contemporary issues in psychology (pp.93-105). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Ekman, P. & Friesen, W. V. (1969) Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception.
Psychiatry, 32, 88-106.
Ekman, P. & Friesen, W. V. (1972). Hand movements. Journal of Communication, 22,
353-374.
Ekman, P. & Friesen, W. V. (1982). Felt, false, and miserable smiles. Journal of
Nonverbal Behavior, 6, 238-252.
Ekman, P., Sorenson, E. R., & Friesen, W. V. (1969). Pan-cultural elements in facial
display of emotions. Science, 164(3875), 86-88.
Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V., & O’Sullivan, M. (1988). Smiles when lying. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 414-420.

54
Feeley, T. H. & deTurck, M. A. (1998). The behavioral correlates of sanctioned and
unsanctioned deceptive communication. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 22,
189-203.
Fiedler, K. & Walka, I. (1993). Training lie detectors to use nonverbal cues instead of
global heuristics. Human Communication Research, 20, 199-223.
Frank, M. G., & Ekman, P. (1997). The ability to detect deceit generalizes across
different typesof high-stake lies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
72, 1429-1439.
Galin, K. E. & Thorn, B. E. (1993). Unmasking pain: detection of deception in facial
expressions. Journal of Clinical & Social Psychology, 12, 182-197.
Goldman-Eisler, F. (1968). Psycholinguistics: Experiments in spontaneous speech. New
York: Doubleday.
Granhag, P. A. & Stromwall, L. A. (2002). Repeated interrogations: verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 243-257.
Greene, J. O., O’Hair, H. D., Cody, M. J., & Yen, C. (1985). Planning and control of
behavior during deception. Human Communication Research, 11, 335-364.
Hample, D. (1982). Empirical evidence for a typology of lies. Paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (68th, Louisville, KY,
November 4-7, 1982).
Heilveil, I. & Muehleman, J. T. (1981). Nonverbal clues to deception in a psychotherapy
analogue. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, and Practice, 18, 329-335.

55
Hess, U. & Kleck, R. E. (1994). The cues decoders use in attempting to differentiate
emotion-elicited and posed facial expressions. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 24, 367-381.
Hocking, J. E. & Leathers D. G.(1980). Nonverbal indicators of deception: A new
theoretical perspective. Communication Monographs, 47, 119-131.
Izard, C.E. (1971). The Face of Emotion. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Knapp, M. L., Hart, R. P., & Dennis, H. S. (1974). An exploration of deception as a
communication construct. Human Communication Research, 5, 15-29.
Kraut, R. E. (1978). Verbal and nonverbal cues in the perception of lying. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 380-391.
Kraut, R. E. (1980). Humans as lie detectors. Journal of communication, 30, 209-216.
Kraut, R. E. & Poe, D. (1980). Behavioral roots of person perception: The deception
judgments of customs inspectors and laymen. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 39, 78-798.
Krauss, R. M. (1981). Impression formation, impression management, and nonverbal
behavior. In E.T. Higgins, C.P. Herman, & M.P.Zanna (Eds.), Social Cognition:
Vol 1. The Ontario Symposium (pp. 323-341). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Lovibond, S. H. & Lovibond, P. F. (1995). Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress
Scales (2nd Ed.) Sydney: Psychology Foundation.
McClintock, C. C. & Hunt, R. G. (1975). Nonverbal indicators of affect and deception in
an interview setting. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 5, 54-67.
Motley, M. T. (1974). Accoustic correlates of lies. Western Speech, 38, 81-87.

56
O’Hair, H. D., Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, M. L. (1981). Prepared lies, spontaneous lies,
Machiavellianism, and nonverbal communication. Human Communication
Research, 7, 325-339.
Porter, S., & Yuille, J.C. (1996). The language of deceit: An investigation of the verbal
clues to deception in the interrogation context. Law and Human Behavior, 20,
443-458.
Ratliff, B., Berman, M. E., and Barry, C. (2006). Examination of the behavioral
correlates of deception using a novel laboratory paradigm. Unpublished
manuscript.
Riggio, R. E. & Friedman, H. S. (1983). Individual differences and cues to deception.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 899-915.
Rotter, J.B. (1975). Some problems and misconceptions related to the construct of
internal versus external control of reinforcement. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 43, 56–67.
Schuiling, G.A. (2004). Deceive, and be deceived! Journal of Psychomatic Obstetrics
and Gynecology, 25 (2), 170-174.
Stiff, J. B. & Miller, G. R. (1986). ’Come to think of it…’ Interrogative probes, deceptive
communication, and deception detection. Human Communication Research, 12,
339-357.
Stern, C., & Stern, W. (1909). Erinnerung, Aussage und Lluge in der ersten Kindheit
[Recollection, testimony, and lying in early childhood]. Leipzig, Germany: Barth.

57
Streeter, L. A., Krauss, R. M., Geller, V., Olson, C., & Apple, W. (1977). Pitch changes
during attempted deception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,
35-350.
Stromwall, L.A. & Granhag, P.A. (2003). How to detect deception? Arresting the beliefs
of police officers, prosecutors and judges. Psychology, Crime, & Law, 9, 19-36.
Vrij, A. (1995). Behavioral correlates of deception in a simulated police interview.
Journal of Psychology, 129, 15-29.
Vrij, A. (2000). Detecting lies and deceit: the psychology of lying and implications for
profession practice. Chichester: Wiley & Sons.
Vrij, A., Edward, K., Roberts, K. P., & Bull, R. (2000). Detecting deceit via analysis of
verbal and nonverbal behavior. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 24, 239-260.
Vrij, A. & Heaven, S. (1999). Vocal and verbal indicators of deception as a function of
lie complexity. Psychology, Crime, & Law, 5, 203-215.
Vrij, A. & Semin, G. R. (1996). Lie experts’ beliefs about nonverbal indicators of
deception. Journal of Nonverbal Behaviour, 20, 65-80.
Waid, W. M., & Orne, M. T. (1982). The physiological detection of deception. American
Scientist, 70, 402-409
Wilson, A. E., Smith, M. D., & Ross, H. S. (2003). The nature and effects of young
children’s lies. Social Development, 12(1), 21-45.
Zaccaro, S. J., Gilbert, J. A., Thor, K. K., & Mumford, M. D. (1991). Leadership and
social intelligence: Linking social perceptiveness and behavioral flexibility to
leader effectiveness. The Leadership Quarterly, 2(4), 317-342.

58
Zuckerman, M. DePaulo, B. M., & Rosenthal, R. (1981). Verbal and nonverbal
communication of deception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 14, pp. 1-59). New York: Academic Press.

